On April 16, 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its preliminary ruling in the joined cases Electricity & Water Authority of the Government of Bahrain and Others (Power Cables, C-672/23) and Smurfit Kappa Europe and Others (Cardboard Packaging, C-673/23). The ruling confirms and refines the so-called Sumal doctrine and its interaction with Article 8(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, with implications for companies facing competition damages litigation across the European Union (EU).
The judgment lowers the threshold for claimants to establish international jurisdiction in competition cases, extends potential liability exposure to intermediate holding companies, and confirms that claims for harm suffered outside the European Economic Area (EEA) are not automatically inadmissible. Companies with corporate group structures in the Netherlands — and, by analogy, in other EU Member States — should consider the implications of this ruling.
Background
Both cases decided by the CJEU arose from competition damages proceedings before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal:
- Power Cables: Utility companies based in Persian Gulf states sought damages based on the European Commission’s (Commission) 2014 cartel decision concerning high-voltage cables. Claims were brought, among others, against Draka Holding B.V., a Dutch intermediate holding company within the Prysmian group, which was not an addressee of the Commission’s infringement decision; and
- Cardboard Packaging: Unilever brought a follow-on damages claim based on a 2019 decision of the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) concerning cardboard packaging cartels. Unilever sued, among others, Smurfit Kappa Europe B.V. and Smurfit International B.V., both in Amsterdam. Neither of those companies were addressees of the relevant infringement decision.1
Under Article 8(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, a claimant may sue multiple defendants domiciled in different EU Member States before the courts of the Member State where one of those defendants is domiciled, so long as the claims are “so closely connected” that it is expedient to hear them together. In competition damages litigation, some claimants have relied on this provision by suing a local “anchor defendant” — often a holding company — as a means of bringing foreign defendants before a single court.
Key Holdings
The following summarizes the key holdings from the CJEU’s preliminary ruling:
- Non-Addressee Anchor Defendants Can Establish Jurisdiction. The CJEU confirmed that Article 8(1)’s close-connection requirement may be satisfied even if the anchor defendant was not named as an addressee in the underlying infringement decision. It is sufficient that there are “serious indications” that the anchor defendant belongs to the same “undertaking” as the companies to which the infringement was attributed (see Sumal2). For jurisdictional purposes, it is enough that — at the time the action is brought — it cannot be excluded that the anchor defendant and the co-defendants form part of the same single economic unit. The designation of specific companies in an infringement decision is relevant evidence but is neither necessary nor sufficient on its own.
- Intermediate Holding Companies Can Be Liable. The CJEU held an intermediate holding company which merely holds and manages shares — without itself carrying out any independent economic activities — may nonetheless form part of the same economic unit and may be held jointly and severally liable for competition law infringements. This will be the case where it exercises decisive influence over a subsidiary whose activities are directly connected to the subject matter of the infringement. In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the Sumal criteria and the Akzo presumption in combination. Liability is first attributed to the subsidiary under Sumal, then extended to the intermediate holding company based on its decisive influence over that subsidiary. While this builds on existing doctrine, it is the first time the Court has explicitly combined these two lines of reasoning.
- Foreseeability Is Not a Standalone Jurisdictional Requirement. Foreseeability — that is, whether a co-defendant could reasonably have anticipated being sued before the court of the anchor defendant — is a general principle underlying the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation. It is not an independent jurisdictional criterion. In other words, foreseeability does not need to be proven as a separate, distinct test. Instead, it is a component to be considered when assessing the overall close connection between claims. If a court holds that a defendant participated as part of an undertaking in a single and continuous infringement, that party may be sued before the courts of another member of that undertaking.
- Prospects of Success Are Not Part of the Jurisdictional Assessment. The CJEU drew a distinction between the jurisdictional assessment and the merits of the case. When determining jurisdiction, a national court need not evaluate the admissibility or likelihood of success of the claim. It must only identify the connecting factors sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Article 8(1). However, claims that are manifestly unfounded, artificial, or brought solely to manufacture jurisdiction may be disregarded. The standard requires that there must be “convincing evidence” that the claimant has artificially satisfied the conditions of Article 8(1). Mere uncertainty as to the artificial nature of a claim is insufficient to meet this threshold.
- Losses Suffered Outside the EEA Do Not Preclude Jurisdiction. The CJEU confirmed that claims relating to losses suffered outside the EEA do not, in themselves, render competition damages claims manifestly unfounded for jurisdictional purposes — provided that a causal link between the claimed damages and the infringing conduct is established.
- Article 8(1) Confers Both International and Territorial Jurisdiction. The CJEU confirmed that Article 8(1) directly confers both international jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction on the court having jurisdiction because of the domicile of the anchor defendant. National procedural rules do not need to be separately consulted for this purpose. Where a court lacks territorial jurisdiction, it may refer the case to the competent court within the same Member State, subject to consistency with national procedural rules and the effectiveness of Brussels I bis.
Implications for Businesses
The judgment has several potential consequences for companies that operate through corporate group structures in the EU:
- Expanded Jurisdictional Exposure Through Holding Companies. Companies that have established intermediate holding companies in the Netherlands — including entities set up primarily for tax or structural purposes —should be aware that these entities may serve as viable anchor defendants in competition damages claims. This is the case even where the holding company itself did not participate in the infringing conduct, provided it exercised decisive influence over an operative subsidiary whose activities are connected to the subject matter of an infringement. This may represent an expansion of litigation risk in the Netherlands for complex corporate groups. The judgment states that the absence of direct economic activity by a holding company does not shield it against liability or against jurisdiction being established through that entity.
- Lower Jurisdictional Threshold for Claimants. The Court confirmed that the threshold for establishing jurisdiction is lower than some defendants may have assumed. Claimants need only show “serious indications” that the anchor defendant belongs to the same undertaking as the addressee defendants. They are not required to prove their case on the merits at the jurisdictional stage. The CJEU’s ruling demonstrated that the bar for courts to dismiss claims as “manifestly unfounded” at the jurisdictional phase is
- Global Damages Claims in EU Courts. The confirmation that harm suffered outside the EEA does not preclude EU court jurisdiction may be relevant for multinational groups and for claimants based in non-EU jurisdictions. Provided parties are able to establish a causal link to the infringing conduct, claimants may seek compensation for worldwide harm before EU courts, using a Dutch — or other EU Member State — holding company as the basis for jurisdiction.
- Competition Compliance and Litigation Strategy. For companies that are or may become the subject of competition enforcement proceedings, the judgment underscores the relevance of considering the full corporate group footprint in the EU when assessing litigation risk. The jurisdictional reach of EU competition damages claims is broader than a strict reading of infringement decisions might suggest. For companies contemplating bringing competition damages claims, the ruling confirms that an EU anchor defendant – including a non-addressee holding company – may be a means for consolidating claims across multiple jurisdictions before a single court.
Conclusion
The CJEU’s judgment in Power Cables and Cardboard Packaging addresses the jurisdictional reach of EU competition damages litigation and clarifies the circumstances under which non-addressee intermediate holding companies can serve as anchor defendants. The ruling consolidates existing case law while combining the Sumal criteria and the Akzo presumption and confirming that harm arising outside of the EEA does not, in itself, defeat jurisdiction.
Debates in national courts regarding the precise evidentiary standards for demonstrating that claims are “manifestly unfounded” may continue. However, the CJEU has set a demanding threshold for such a finding, and the boundaries of this ruling may be tested in ongoing and future proceedings.
1 For reference, Smurfit International B.V., as the ultimate parent company, indirectly holds, through Smurfit Kappa Europe B.V., the entire share capital of the alleged infringer Smurfit Kappa Italia S.P.A.
2 Simplified, under Sumal, a claimant would have to prove that (a) the subsidiary and the parent constitute a single economic unit (e.g., 100% ownership or decisive influence), and (b) a specific link exists between the economic activity of the subsidiary and the subject matter of the (alleged) infringement (e.g., the subsidiary sells products affected by the alleged cartel).
