On March 6, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a significant decision clarifying how discrimination claims brought by majority-group plaintiffs should be analyzed under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD).
In Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, the court concluded that majority-group plaintiffs should not be required to satisfy the “background circumstances” rule—a doctrine that imposed a heightened burden on plaintiffs alleging discrimination against majority groups. In reaching that conclusion, the court, predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court would do the same, relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, which rejected the background circumstances rule in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) cases. Massey marks the first federal appellate decision to apply Ames to state law.
Context: The Background Circumstances Rule
Prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in Massey, in reverse discrimination cases under the NJLAD, plaintiffs who are members of traditionally advantaged groups had to satisfy the “background circumstances” requirement as part of their prima facie case. That is, plaintiff, who is not in the minority, must “show that [they have] been victimized by an unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” The “background circumstances” rule modified the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework in that a majority-group plaintiff had to show more than the mere fact that that they were discriminated against based on their protected class.
This rule applied uniformly across protected classes—such as race, sex, and other protected characteristics—where the plaintiff belongs to the majority group.
Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield
Factual Background
The case arose after Christopher Massey, a white male and longtime police officer who served as Deputy Chief and as the acting officer in charge of the Bergenfield Police Department, was passed over for promotion to Chief. The Borough instead promoted another candidate, an Arab-Muslim male. After the Borough denied Massey the promotion, Massey filed suit asserting discrimination claims under the NJLAD and federal civil rights statutes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Borough, applying the “background circumstances” rule and concluding that Massey had not demonstrated that the Borough was the type of “unusual employer” that discriminates against members of a majority group.
Third Circuit’s Decision
On appeal, the Third Circuit faced the question of whether New Jersey’s background circumstances rule is viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ames—resolving a state-law matter that the New Jersey state courts have not yet had the opportunity to address. The Ames Court unanimously held that the Rule “is not consistent with Title VII’s text or . . . case law construing the statute” and Title VII “draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.” Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII does not impose a heightened burden on majority-group plaintiffs and rejected the background circumstances rule as inconsistent with the statute’s text.
Since New Jersey state courts have not addressed the issue, the Massey court explained that its role was to “predict” how the New Jersey Supreme Court would decide the relevant legal issue. The court concluded that the New Jersey Supreme Court would likely abandon the “background circumstances” rule, since New Jersey courts often rely on federal law as interpretive authority, and the pertinent text from Title VII and the NJLAD are identical. Both statutes prohibit discrimination against “any” person, leaving little room for special evidentiary hurdles that apply only to majority-group plaintiffs.
The Third Circuit also emphasized the NJLAD’s broad policy goal of eradicating workplace discrimination. Therefore, given the identical statutory language and New Jersey’s public policy goals, the court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow Ames and reject the rule altogether.
Using this reasoning, the court applied the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, without the heightened burden to Massey’s case. The Third Circuit concluded that Massey presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the Borough’s motives in the promotion decision. For example, the court noted that the Borough conceded in their summary judgment motion that they “considered . . . race” when deciding on the promotion, and Massey testified that the Borough Administrator told him the decision was “all about race.” As a result, the court reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment on the NJLAD and related constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, while affirming dismissal of one federal claim.
Post-Decision Implications
The Massey decision has significant implications for employment-discrimination claims under the NJLAD. By predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow Ames and abandon the “background circumstances” rule, the Third Circuit signaled that majority-group plaintiffs should not face heightened evidentiary standards when bringing New Jersey state discrimination claims. Rather, they should be subject to the same framework as minority plaintiffs. In practice, this shift may allow more reverse discrimination claims to survive dismissal.
Staff Attorney Elizabeth Ledkovsky contributed to the preparation of this piece.
